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Saving the Euro: a Pyrrhic Victory?
Nicholas Crafts
Summary points
z z The survival of the euro has entailed a lengthy recession and has left an ominous 
legacy of public debt, but the fundamental flaws in its original design have not 
been corrected.
z z In the 1930s the collapse of the Gold Standard was an integral part of the 
recovery process from the Great Depression, but many policy-makers believe that 
to mimic this approach in the case of the eurozone today would be too risky.
z z Fiscal consolidation alone seems inadequate to address the fiscal sustainability 
problems of highly indebted economies in the euro area; financial repression and 
debt relief will also be needed to address the debt overhang.
z z The design of the European Central Bank is not helpful for spearheading economic 
recovery in the present circumstances. Indeed, a ‘subservient’ 1950s-style central 
bank, rather than an independent one, would be more effective.
z z The crisis has inflicted significant damage to future growth prospects in the 
eurozone, both through the debt legacy it has created and in terms of the impetus 
it has given to detrimental supply-side policies.
z z The euro has probably been saved, but this has come at a very high price, resulting 
in what may well be a ‘lost decade’ for southern Europe.
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2 Saving the Euro: a Pyrrhic Victory?
Introduction
The euro appears to have survived the crisis. Despite numerous 
predictions that at least one country would leave the euro-
zone, and fears that a disorderly collapse of the economic 
and monetary union could ensue, the worst seems to be over. 
Today thoughts are turning to recovery, while the urgency of 
fundamentally reforming the currency union has receded. 
The survival of the euro and the prospect of enduring even 
relatively limited sovereign default are in marked contrast to 
the 1930s when the Gold Standard disintegrated completely 
and there was a major sovereign debt crisis.
Prima facie, the continued existence of the eurozone 
may be viewed as a success. Yet exiting the Gold Standard 
was a big part of the solution to the macroeconomic 
problems of the Great Depression. Economies which 
devalued early, such as the Nordic countries, experienced 
an early return to strong growth. Similarly, countries 
which defaulted grew more rapidly than those which 
did not. This raises the question as to whether the 
survival of the single currency and the associated bailout 
programmes have come at a very high price in terms of 
much-reduced growth prospects. For troubled members 
of the eurozone, there is a threat of a ‘lost decade’ that 
is more akin to Latin America in the 1980s than to 
Scandinavia 80 years ago.
To economic historians familiar with the inter-war 
experience, the survival of the euro seems rather puzzling 
and raises a number of interesting questions. If this time 
it is different, why? If the disintegration of the euro is 
still a threat, what does economic history suggest will be 
required to prevent this occurring, and what are the impli-
cations for growth? Similarly, in the absence of default 
– and within the eurozone where most of the traditional 
approaches to dealing with the adverse fiscal legacy of 
the crisis are precluded – how will countries deal with 
the burden of very high public debt-to-GDP ratios? And, 
finally, can fiscal sustainability be achieved without seri-
ously damaging growth? 
This paper reviews the post-crisis prospects for 
medium-term growth in the euro area and concludes both 
that the process of saving the euro has been costly and that 
the downside risks to growth are considerable in a world 
of high debt-to-GDP ratios and an incompletely reformed 
currency union.1 In this context, the options available to 
policy-makers are rather unattractive.
What can we learn from the 1930s?
In 1929 virtually all major economies were on the 
Gold Standard, but by late 1936 the French devaluation 
signalled the final demise of an international monetary 
system based on free convertibility of currencies into gold 
at a fixed parity. Famously, the United Kingdom made an 
ignominious exit in September 1931, having rejoined the 
Gold Standard only six years earlier. The decision to leave 
the Gold Standard has been analysed by Wolf (2008), 
who used an econometric model to examine the odds 
of staying on gold. He found that a country was more 
likely to leave if its main trading partner did so, if it had 
returned to gold at a high parity, if it was a democracy or 
if the central bank was independent. On the other hand, 
his findings showed that a country was less likely to leave 
if it had large gold reserves, less price deflation and strong 
banks. 
In other words, decisions as to whether to leave 
the Gold Standard were influenced by the strength of 
worries about the loss of monetary discipline, the extent 
of deflationary pain and deteriorating international 
competitiveness. The model predicts departures well and 
reveals that France was under the least pressure to exit in 
the early 1930s. It also suggests that democratic politics 
undermined the Gold Standard. With a much broader 
  1  This paper draws on themes developed in Crafts and Fearon (2010) and Crafts (2013a and 2013b).
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3 Saving the Euro: a Pyrrhic Victory?
electorate, the use of deflationary policies to stay on gold 
was much less acceptable than in the nineteenth century. 
For example, this can be seen clearly in the pivotal case 
of the UK where the changed political climate resulted in 
the politicization of monetary policy even after the coun-
try’s return to gold, and this was reflected in the great 
reluctance of the Bank of England to raise interest rates 
in the 1931 crisis when the bank rate was only increased 
to 4.5%.2
It is well known that staying on the Gold Standard in 
the 1930s increased the severity and duration of the down-
turn associated with the Great Depression (Bernanke, 
1995). In contrast, early abandonment of the fixed Gold 
Standard exchange rate promoted early and often quite 
rapid recovery. This is highlighted in the contrasting 
fortunes of the ‘sterling bloc’ and ‘gold bloc’ countries 
shown in Table 1.
For the typical small open economy, the big problem 
as the Depression took hold was being subjected to 
deflationary pressures as world output and prices fell while 
being severely constrained in policy-making by adhering 
to the Gold Standard. The concept of the macroeconomic 
trilemma suggests that such a country can only have two of 
a fixed exchange rate, capital mobility and an independent 
monetary policy (Obstfeld and Taylor, 2004). It follows, 
therefore, that for countries on the Gold Standard, a mone-
tary policy response to deflationary shocks needed to be 
coordinated across countries (thereby allowing interest 
rate differentials to remain unchanged). But as Wolf 
(2013) makes clear, international coordination was out 
of the question. Besides having no control over monetary 
policy, staying on the Gold Standard required reductions 
in prices and money wages to maintain competitive-
ness and entailed a period of high real interest rates and 
increases in real labour costs and unemployment – overall 
a very difficult adjustment. By the end of 1933, France 
had suffered a loss of competitiveness of nearly 30% 
versus the UK (Eichengreen, 1992, Table 12.3). Leaving 
the Gold Standard delivered autonomy over monetary 
policy that allowed lower interest rates, ended deflationary 
pressure, cut real wages and also stimulated investment 
(Eichengreen and Sachs, 1985). 
The 1930s saw a massive resort to protectionist 
policies and are often seen as a period of ‘trade war’. 
Increased barriers to trade clearly played an important 
role in reducing trade volumes in the 1930s; protectionism 
perhaps accounted for around 40% of the 24% fall in 
the volume of trade in the early 1930s (Madsen, 2001). 
The goals of protectionist policies were typically to safe-
guard employment, to improve the country’s balance of 
payments and to raise prices. Unlike today, there were 
no constraints from World Trade Organization (WTO) 
membership. Protectionism is usually thought of as the 
triumph of special-interest groups but in this period it 
may have been more a substitute for a macroeconomic 
policy response. Eichengreen and Irwin (2010) found that, 
on average, tariffs were higher in countries that stayed on 
gold longer and so had less scope to use monetary or fiscal 
  2  The UK exit from gold in 1931 can plausibly be interpreted as a ‘second-generation currency crisis’ when a speculative attack was in effect accommodated by 
the authorities who were unwilling to raise interest rates at a time when market expectations of devaluation responded strongly to increases in unemployment 
(Eichengreen and Jeanne, 2000).
Sterling bloc Gold bloc
1929 100.0 100.0
1930 100.4  97.3
1931  95.8  93.6
1932  96.1  90.3
1933  98.8  93.2
1934 105.0  92.5
1935 109.1  93.4
1936 113.9  94.6
1937 117.7 101.0
1938 119.5 100.8
Table 1: Real GDP in the ‘sterling bloc’ and the 
‘gold bloc’, 1929–38 (1929 = 100)
Notes: The ’sterling bloc’ comprised Denmark, Norway, Sweden and 
the UK, all of which left the Gold Standard and devalued in September 
1931; the ‘gold bloc’ comprised Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands 
and Switzerland, all of which stayed on the Gold Standard until the 
autumn of 1936, apart from Belgium, which exited in March 1935.
Source: Derived using Maddison (2010) and updated with the 
Maddison Project (2013).www.chathamhouse.org   www.warwick.ac.uk/go/cage
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4 Saving the Euro: a Pyrrhic Victory?
policies to promote economic recovery. Their research 
suggests that the financial crisis of 1931, rather than the 
Smoot-Hawley tariff, was the real trigger for the trade war 
of the 1930s.3
For the UK, leaving the Gold Standard had a further 
major advantage, namely that it made the fiscal arithmetic 
of dealing with the large overhang of public debt from the 
First World War and the price deflation of the 1920s much 
less daunting. This is illustrated in Table 2.
The required primary budget surplus as a percentage 
of GDP for fiscal sustainability (defined in terms of 
stabilizing the public debt-to-GDP ratio) depends posi-
tively on the size of the outstanding stock of debt as a 
percentage of GDP and the real interest rate, and nega-
tively on the rate of growth of real GDP. Compared with 
the late 1920s, the recovery of the 1930s was character-
ized by much lower real interest rates on government 
borrowing once price falls ended and interest rates 
could be reduced, and by faster GDP growth. In fact, 
the interest rate/growth rate differential was negative in 
the mid-1930s, implying that it would even have been 
possible to run primary budget deficits and to reduce the 
debt-to-GDP ratio. 
In the UK, this circumstance arose partly because of 
the direct effects of the so-called ‘cheap money policy’ 
which held nominal interest rates down in a world of 
limited capital mobility, and partly because of strong 
private-sector growth. But it was also greatly aided by the 
end of price deflation once interest rates had reached the 
‘lower bound’.4 The cheap money policy was run by HM 
Treasury, not the Bank of England, the implication being 
that debt management objectives were given a large weight 
in monetary policy.
Sovereign default was widespread in the 1930s – in Latin 
America much more so than in the debt crisis of the 1980s 
– and was an important element of the world economic 
crisis and the withdrawal of Latin American countries in 
particular from the world economy. Default was typically 
triggered by the increased burden of debt service as the 
Great Depression intensified and export prices fell while 
real interest rates rose. An analysis of the implications of 
default shows that it promoted growth, especially for heavy 
  3  The Smoot-Hawley tariff refers to the United States Tariff Act of 17 June 1930, which significantly raised levels of protection and is often seen as provoking 
substantial retaliation by other countries.
  4  The reductions in the debt-to-GDP ratio, which fell from 1.79 in 1933 to 1.44 in 1938, were about two-thirds due to budget surpluses and one-third due to 
the favourable interest rate/growth rate differential (Crafts and Mills, 2012). The ‘lower bound’ is that nominal interest rates cannot be negative – when it is 
reached, real interest rates are higher the faster prices fall.
b i π g d b*
1925–29 average 6.78 4.72 -0.99 2.22 1.636 5.71
1933–38 average 5.04 3.67 1.67 3.59 1.612 -1.38
Table 2: UK fiscal sustainability data, 1925–29 
and 1933–38
Note: The required primary budget surplus-to-GDP ratio, b*, satisfies 
the condition that  Δd = 0, where Δd = -b + (i – π – g)d.
Sources: b, primary budget surplus-to-GDP ratio (%); i, average 
nominal interest rate on government debt (%); and d, public debt-to-
GDP ratio (%) from Middleton (1996); π, rate of inflation (%) based on 
GDP deflator from Feinstein (1972); g, 4th-quarter real GDP growth 
rate (%) from Mitchell et al. (2012).
1929 100.0 1980 100.0
1930  93.1 1981  98.1
1931  85.8 1982  94.8
1932  80.7 1983  90.0
1933  85.3 1984  91.6
1934  90.9 1985  92.7
1935  94.3 1986  94.9
1936  98.1 1987  96.2
1937 101.6 1988  94.9
1938 102.7 1989  94.1
Table 3: Real GDP per capita in Latin America, 
1929–38 and 1980–89 (1929 and 1980 = 100)
Note: Latin America comprises Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
Source: Maddison (2010).www.warwick.ac.uk/go/cage     www.chathamhouse.org
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5 Saving the Euro: a Pyrrhic Victory?
defaulters (Eichengreen and Portes, 1990). A comparison 
of growth in Latin America (Table 3) shows that recovery 
in the 1930s came much sooner, with 1929 levels of real 
GDP per capita being regained by 1937, whereas the 1980 
level was not matched until 1994. In the 1930s, sovereign 
debts were owed to private bondholders rather than to 
banks. This was important in permitting a relaxed attitude 
by lender governments, which contrasted with the pressure 
exerted in the 1980s to limit default, given the systemic 
risks to American banks (Eichengreen and Portes, 1989).
This analysis highlights several points of relevance 
to today’s eurozone crisis. First, in the 1930s, devalua-
tion, perhaps accompanied by default, was the route to 
recovery. Macroeconomic trilemma choices were dramati-
cally revised. Second, exit from the Gold Standard was 
contagious. Third, when orthodox macroeconomic poli-
cies were unavailable as a way to fight unemployment, 
protectionism was to be expected. Lastly, falling prices 
make achieving fiscal sustainability at high public debt-
to-GDP ratios very demanding in terms of the required 
budget surplus so that if deflation is required to restore 
competitiveness in a fixed exchange-rate system, ‘austerity 
fatigue’ is a likely consequence.
Why has the euro not collapsed like the 
inter-war Gold Standard?
Despite the apparent precedent of the 1930s, the eurozone 
has not yet collapsed, so this time it may be different 
for several reasons, which implies that the benefit/cost 
ratio of leaving the Gold Standard was rather different 
from that of exiting the eurozone. First, an exit from 
the Gold Standard was much easier. Countries had their 
own currencies in place and there was no equivalent to 
today’s treaty obligations, which mean that leaving the 
euro entails an exit from the EU. Indeed, there was much 
less risk of provoking ‘the mother of all financial crises’ 
through capital flight and a devastating run on the banks 
(Eichengreen and Temin, 2013). 
Second, in the 1930s there was no real equivalent to 
today’s ‘doomloop’ of deadly feedback effects between 
sovereign debt and banking crises. The threat to public 
finances from financial instability is much larger than in 
previous generations because bank balance sheets are now 
much larger relative to GDP.5 The ratio of bank assets to 
GDP was at least three by 2009 in six countries (Austria, 
Belgium, France, Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain) 
(Obstfeld, 2013), whereas until the 1970s it was typi-
cally less than one in advanced countries (Schularick and 
Taylor, 2012). Equally, the threat to financial stability from 
sovereign default is considerably greater now than in the 
1930s because the debts are owed to banks rather than to 
private bondholders. 
Third, the perception of dire consequences of a 
devaluation and default for other eurozone countries 
in an integrated capital market with much bigger bank 
balance sheets that feature substantial amounts of 
sovereign debt led to the provision of financial support 
with conditionality under the auspices of the ‘troika’.6 
Moreover, the European Central Bank (ECB) has acted 
as a lender of last resort not only to banks but also to 
sovereigns through sovereign debt purchases and its 
offer of outright monetary transactions (OMT).
This list is notable for three missing items. First, 
there is no suggestion that countries remain in the euro 
  5  According to the criteria adopted by economists from the International Monetary Fund, there have been systemic banking crises in eight eurozone economies 
since 2008 (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Spain), with borderline-systemic crises in four more (France, Italy, 
Portugal and Slovenia) (Laeven and Valencia, 2012).
  6  The ‘troika’ comprises three lenders, namely the European Central Bank, the EU and the IMF.
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6 Saving the Euro: a Pyrrhic Victory?
because the fundamental flaws in its original design 
will soon be removed. The European Commission 
(2012) has proposed a redesign for the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) which would eventually 
develop a fully-fledged banking union, fiscal union and 
participatory democracy at the federal level – in effect 
a ‘United States of Europe’. This could greatly reduce 
the risks of banking crises, better sharing of burdens 
of adjustment between surplus and deficit countries, 
together with the realization of economies of scale in 
the provision of federal public goods, the internalization 
of externalities and mutual insurance against asymmetric 
shocks. However, this outcome seems quite unlikely any 
time soon; voters in different European countries have 
very different preferences for the design of a reformed EU. 
In other words, ‘heterogeneity costs’ are probably too high 
to allow the realization of these putative benefits (Spolaore, 
2013).7
Second, the survival of the euro is not based on 
good macroeconomic outcomes. Economic performance 
in eurozone countries remains very weak, as Table 4 
demonstrates. Current estimates by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) are 
that for the euro area as a whole real GDP in 2014 will 
still not have regained its pre-crisis peak. Meanwhile, 
the experience of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain looks much more like that of the countries which 
remained on the Gold Standard in the early 1930s than 
those which left. Prolonged recession has been accom-
panied by rapidly rising unemployment, from 7.4% in 
2007 to a projected 12.3% in 2014 in the euro area, but 
with much more dramatic increases in both Greece and 
Spain, in particular, where unemployment is forecast to be 
around 28% next year. Price deflation has generally been 
avoided, but inflation remains very low so the growth 
  7  On measures of ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity typically used to proxy for ‘heterogeneity costs’, the EU countries are not good candidates to form a 
European federation.
2007 2012 2014
Real GDP (2007 = 100)
France  100  99.9 100.4
Germany  100 103.5 105.9
Greece  100  80.0  75.2
Ireland  100  93.9  96.6
Italy  100  93.1  91.8
Portugal  100  94.2  91.9
Spain  100  95.9  94.6
Euro area  100  98.8  99.3
Inflation (% per year)
France  2.6  1.3  0.8
Germany  1.6  1.3  1.7
Greece  3.3 -0.8 -2.1
Ireland  0.7  1.9  1.2
Italy  2.4  1.6  0.9
Portugal  2.8  -0.1  0.0
Spain  3.3  0.3  0.4
Euro area  2.3  1.2  1.1
Unemployment (%)
France  8.0  9.9 11.1
Germany  8.3  5.3  4.8
Greece  8.3 24.2 28.4
Ireland  4.6 14.7 14.1
Italy  6.1 10.6 12.5
Portugal  8.0 15.6 18.6
Spain  8.3 25.0 28.0
Euro area  7.4 11.2 12.3
Table 4: Euro area macroeconomic indicators
Note: Inflation based on GDP deflator.
Source: OECD (2013).
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7 Saving the Euro: a Pyrrhic Victory?
of nominal GDP in the euro area is projected to average 
only about 1.5% per year in 2013 and 2014. It is apparent 
that public debt-to-GDP ratios are high and rising, as 
Table 5 highlights. Indeed, prolonged recession and the 
costs of dealing with banking crises have wreaked havoc 
with the fiscal indicators.
Third, competitiveness problems have not been fully 
resolved even though balance-of-payments deficits are 
much smaller than in 2007. Continued membership 
of the euro has not been facilitated by wage flexibility. 
Indeed, euro-periphery economies appear close to down-
ward nominal wage rigidity – only in Greece were labour 
costs per hour lower in 2012 than in 2008 (Eurostat, 
2013). Substantial further improvements in competitive-
ness are required to restore sustainable external positions 
in the face of high external debt, and many more years 
of high unemployment will be needed to achieve these 
adjustments (Guillemette and Turner, 2013). The labour 
market adjustment issues in the periphery would be 
mitigated if the ECB credibly targeted higher rates of 
inflation for a period; this would not only reduce real 
interest rates but would also lower real wages and restore 
competitiveness in the periphery (Schmitt-Grohé and 
Uribe, 2013).
How can policy-makers address the 
legacy of high public debt-to-GDP 
ratios?
Since 2007, public debt-to-GDP ratios in the eurozone 
have risen considerably and for many countries are 
well above the Maastricht limit of 60%. If projections of 
interest rate/growth rate differentials of well over two 
percentage points for the high-debt eurozone economies 
are correct (Ghosh et al., 2013), then just stabilizing the 
debt-to-GDP ratio will require primary budget surpluses 
of around 3% of GDP to be maintained permanently. This 
would be a level which is about the maximum sustained 
for any lengthy period in advanced economies (IMF, 
2013). The fiscal consolidation needed to bring debt ratios 
down to the 60% level over, say, a 20-year period looks 
extremely painful in a number of countries, including 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain (OECD, 2013) and is 
quite possibly beyond what is politically feasible (Buiter 
and Rahbari, 2013). This suspicion is supported by the 
historical record of how big reductions in debt-to-GDP 
ratios have been achieved. As Table 6 shows, in cases 
where the average reduction was from a ratio of 137% to 
80%, only a little more than half the reduction came from 
budget surpluses, with interest rate/growth rate differen-
tials contributing at least as much – an outcome that will 
be very difficult to repeat in today’s circumstances. In any 
event, dealing with the legacy of the crisis through fiscal 
orthodoxy alone will entail a long period of high public 
debt-to-GDP ratios. 
What are possible alternative strategies? One obvious 
option is ‘financial repression’, which is based on trying to 
hold down the interest rates at which government borrows 
and works through manipulating the interest rate/growth 
rate differential.8 In the era of capital controls, this played 
a major part in the reduction in public debt-to-GDP 
ratios in the UK and elsewhere after the Second World 
War (Reinhart and Sbrancia, 2011), as is reflected in the 
1945–70 data in Table 6. This was a period when central 
banks were generally ‘subservient’ to governments rather 
  8  ‘Financial repression’ occurs when governments intervene to gain access to funds at below-market interest rates typically through moral suasion, regulations 
imposed on the capital market, including imposing obstacles to international capital mobility, and restrictions on interest rates. 
2007 2012 2014
France  73.0 109.7 116.3
Germany  65.6  89.2  85.1
Greece 119.3 165.6 189.2
Ireland  28.6 123.3 126.4
Italy 114.4 140.2 143.9
Portugal  75.5 138.8 147.3
Spain  42.4  90.5 103.5
Euro Area  72.3 103.9 106.9
Table 5: General government gross debt  
(% GDP)
Source: OECD (2013).www.chathamhouse.org   www.warwick.ac.uk/go/cage
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8 Saving the Euro: a Pyrrhic Victory?
than independent (Goodhart, 2010) and this greatly facili-
tated ‘financial repression’ in the UK, for example, in the 
1930s.
Although EU rules guarantee free movement of capital 
and the independence of the ECB, countries largely 
retain sovereignty over fiscal and financial matters, and 
that gives them scope for financial repression which 
has already been exploited (van Riet, 2013). Even at the 
European level, Basel III rules for capital adequacy of 
banks will privilege government bonds as zero-risk and 
EU law allows for capital controls in exceptional circum-
stances. Governments under financial stress may well be 
granted increased leeway to introduce national regulatory 
actions and moral suasion in support of government debt 
financing.9 
A second possibility is simply to write down public 
debt by some combination of default, restructuring or 
debt forgiveness. Debt restructuring surely should play 
some part when banks are strong enough, but this is 
unlikely to be a major step towards achieving the 60% 
‘safe level’ for all the problem countries. The ‘haircut’ 
needed to achieve this for a country with a debt-to-GDP 
ratio of 150% is 60%, which for a country capable of 
growing at 2% per year and able to borrow at a real rate 
of 5% would allow the debt-to-GDP ratio to be stabilized 
thereafter at the ‘safe level’ by running a primary budget 
surplus of 1.8% of GDP. 
It is perhaps helpful, therefore, to remember that, at the 
end of the 1980s, Brady Bonds played an important part in 
ending Latin America’s ‘lost decade’ (Arslanalp and Henry, 
2006). Paris and Wyplosz (2013) note that to forgive only 
25% of the debts of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Spain 
and France would cost about €1,200bn, an undertaking 
which can probably only be carried out by having the 
ECB buy up government debt in exchange for perpetual 
interest-free loans, in effect monetizing the debt at the 
eurozone level.10 Although this is a neat technical solution, 
provided that a credible framework could be devised to 
preclude any repetition down the road (namely to remove 
the future moral hazard), the political obstacles are prob-
ably insuperable.
This further reinforces the point that, in current 
circumstances, the eurozone would benefit from having 
a different sort of central bank. More inflation would 
help adjustment in southern Europe, while holding down 
interest rates for the purpose of financial repression and 
monetizing some of the debt would help address the debt 
overhang problem.
  9  Van Riet (2013) itemizes a list of measures already undertaken that epitomize financial repression, especially in distressed eurozone economies, and 
discusses the financially repressive implications of new prudential regulations and protective measures against market turmoil. Reichlin (2013) views recent 
trends in bank balance sheets to a greater bias in favour of domestic government bonds as a ‘balkanization’ of the market.
 10  €1,200 billion added to the ECB’s balance sheet in this way would increase it by about 50%.
Start  Initial ratio Final ratio Decrease Budget surplus 
component
Growth-interest 
differential 
component
Residual  
adjustment
Pre-1914  88.9 62.3 26.7 18.5  9.3 -1.2
1914–44 121.7 87.7 34.0 23.1 12.0 -1.0
1945–70  92.3 32.7 59.6 20.7 53.2 -14.2
Post-1970  73.6 46.3 27.3 22.7  0.8 3.8
Ratio > 80 136.7 79.6 57.1 29.0 37.4 -9.3
Ratio < 80  55.2 33.9 21.3 15.1  4.3 1.9
Table 6: Breakdown of large debt-ratio reductions (averages as % GDP)
Notes: Examples do not include cases where default occurred. The accounting is based on a permutation of the fiscal sustainability formula and the 
residual adjustment covers valuation effects, errors and ‘below-the-line’ fiscal operations.
Source: Ali Abbas et al. (2011). www.warwick.ac.uk/go/cage     www.chathamhouse.org
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9 Saving the Euro: a Pyrrhic Victory?
What are the implications of the crisis 
for eurozone growth prospects?
Overall, the implication of this analysis is that many euro-
zone countries face a debt overhang that is likely to last for 
many years. The long-term implications of high levels of 
public debt are likely to be unfavourable for growth. The 
adverse impact can occur through a number of transmis-
sion mechanisms, including reductions in market-sector 
capital formation, higher long-term interest rates and 
higher tax rates. Empirical research on advanced econo-
mies has found negative relationships: for example, Kumar 
and Woo (2010) estimate that a 10 percentage point 
increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with a fall 
of about 0.2 percentage points in growth. If taken literally, 
this could imply that the future trend growth rate would 
be as much as 0.75 percentage points lower than countries’ 
pre-crisis performance.11 
Continuing fiscal consolidation is unlikely to be expan-
sionary; on the contrary, the implications are likely to be 
deflationary and to entail (possibly considerable) GDP 
losses. The estimates in Guajardo et al. (2011) are that, 
on average, a fiscal consolidation of 1% of GDP reduces 
real GDP by 0.62% over the following two years in the 
absence of mitigating effects through monetary stimulus 
and/or exchange-rate depreciation. If the fiscal adjust-
ment is achieved through expenditure cuts rather than 
tax increases and accompanied by structural reforms, the 
evidence is that output losses may be lower, in particular 
because private investment tends to respond favourably 
(Alesina et al., 2012). Nevertheless, it is reasonable to 
suppose that post-crisis fiscal adjustment is likely to be a 
drag on medium-term growth.
It is generally believed that expenditure-based consol-
idations have a greater chance of success (Molnar, 2012) 
and it might be thought that if this argument informs 
post-crisis policy it would minimize harmful supply-
side effects on growth by mitigating distortionary tax 
increases. However, cuts in expenditure on education 
(which adds to human capital) and on infrastructure 
(which adds to physical capital) are bad for long-term 
growth. Unfortunately, it is noticeable that, at high 
levels of debt, addressing a rising debt-to-GDP ratio 
typically entails cuts in both public investment and 
education spending (Bacchiocchi et al., 2011). Hence 
the strong likelihood that post-crisis fiscal consolida-
tion will undermine these expenditures is not good 
news for the growth prospects of highly indebted EU 
countries.
A further implication of high public debt-to-GDP ratios 
is that they seriously reduce the scope for fiscal stimulus 
to boost growth. As is well known, worries about fiscal 
sustainability have already undermined a willingness to 
use fiscal stimulus. Much less widely noticed, however, is 
that the legacy of the crisis will be a lengthy period when 
public debt-to-GDP ratios are at a level which poten-
tially renders fiscal stimulus ineffective. Auerbach and 
Gorodnichenko (2011) find that at debt-to-GDP ratios of 
more than 100%, fiscal multipliers are close to zero, even 
in deep recessions, while Ilzetzki et al. (2010) suggest that, 
on average, the fiscal multiplier is zero on impact and in 
the long run is actually negative at debt-to-GDP ratios 
above 60%. For euro area economies, which have given up 
the independent monetary policy instrument, the impli-
cation may be that they have little or no scope to deliver 
economic stimulus through expansionary macroeconomic 
policies.
 11  Although there is a significant negative relationship between debt and growth, the magnitude seems to vary across countries and the claim that a particular 
threshold – such as the 90% debt-to-GDP ratio suggested by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) – can be identified as the point where the adverse effect 
intensifies is probably not robust (Egert, 2013).
‘
Continuing fiscal consolidation 
is unlikely to be expansionary; 
on the contrary, the implications 
are likely to be deflationary and 
to entail (possibly considerable) 
GDP losses ’www.chathamhouse.org   www.warwick.ac.uk/go/cage
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In the 1930s, countries ‘trapped’ in the Gold Standard 
turned to imposing barriers to trade, faute de mieux. 
Today’s equivalent includes an increased reluctance 
to implement the Single Market in services and the 
creeping protectionism documented by Global Trade 
Alert in Table 7. These interventions are mostly not 
flagrant violations of WTO rules, and traditional tariff 
measures are only a small part of what has happened. 
The European Commission and EU member states 
have been by far the most active protectionists.12 EU 
protectionism has entailed a relatively high level of 
discrimination against foreign commercial interests and 
of selectivity among firms, compared with other leading 
economic powers. And 84% of interventions in the EU 
have employed policy instruments that are subject to 
low or no regulation by the WTO, using measures such 
as bailouts, trade finance and subsidies, with the EU 
state-aids regime effectively suspended (Aggarwal and 
Evenett, 2012).
In Europe, the post-Depression response was also to 
embrace selective industrial policy, picking winners and 
supporting national champions but especially helping 
losers, a reaction which was intensified when macroeco-
nomic troubles and globalization challenges returned in 
the 1970s (Foreman-Peck, 2006). In practice, industrial 
policy was heavily skewed to slowing down the exit of 
badly performing firms with adverse consequences for 
productivity performance and this may be an inherent 
characteristic of such policies (Baldwin and Robert-
Nicoud, 2007). Also, allowing creative destruction to take 
its course can be seen to have been a superior policy for 
high-income countries (Fogel et al., 2008). Unfortunately, 
in the aftermath of the present crisis, the early signs are not 
good; there has already been a serious reversion to the use 
of selective industrial policy and this has come in the guise 
of helping losers.
Across Europe in the 1930s – although the link was 
not automatic and depended on the electoral system 
and democratic tradition – prolonged stagnation signifi-
cantly increased the electoral prospects of right-wing 
extremist parties (de Bromhead et al., 2013) and these 
were not market-friendly. In this context, not only might 
it be reasonable to worry about recent election results, 
but it should also be recognized that opinion polls show 
disappointingly low support for the market economy 
in countries where economic recovery seems a remote 
 12  Clearly, this does not entail a return to the rampant protectionism of the 1930s. Nevertheless, the direction is certainly towards a slowdown in economic 
integration.
‘
The threat, both to growth 
and to European economic 
integration, is of populist 
governments which seek to  
take damaging anti-market  
measures ’
a) By type
Bailout/state aid 517 Investment 112
Trade defence 517 Migration 94
Tariff 263 Export subsidy 83
Non-tariff barrier (n.e.s.) 173 Trade finance 78
Export taxes 123 Public procurement 52
b) Number of measures imposed by G20 countries
EU  69 Japan 49
France  98 UK 105
Germany 107 US 49
Italy 101 G20 1359
Table 7: Number of crisis-era protectionist 
measures recorded by Global Trade Alert
Note: ‘Trade defence’ comprises anti-dumping, countervailing duties 
and safeguard measures.
Source: Evenett (2013).www.warwick.ac.uk/go/cage     www.chathamhouse.org
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prospect. Last year, in response to the question ‘Are people 
better off in a free market economy?’, only 44% in Greece, 
47% in Spain and 50% in Italy agreed (Pew Research, 
2012). In 2007, 67% in Spain and 73% in Italy had agreed 
with that question (no data for Greece). This does not bode 
well for the market-friendly supply-side reforms which 
pre-crisis experience suggested would partly underpin 
medium-term growth (OECD, 2013). Instead, the threat, 
both to growth and to European economic integration, 
is of populist governments which seek to take damaging 
anti-market measures.
Finally, the legacy of the crisis for capital-market inte-
gration is likely to be a negative one. Not only are there 
significant fiscal pressures for financial repression, but 
these will be reinforced by the difficulty of resolving 
banking-sector problems in the absence of a fully-fledged 
banking and fiscal union and in the presence of very 
big bank balance sheets relative to the fiscal resources 
of individual nations. In these circumstances, countries 
may be unable to sustain both cross-border financial 
integration and financial stability on the basis of national 
fiscal independence and may seek to withdraw from a 
single financial market to reduce financial stability risks 
(Obstfeld, 2013). Overall, it seems clear that, while the 
euro may have been saved, medium-term growth pros-
pects have been jeopardized. 
Conclusion
Taken at face value, the example of the 1930s suggests 
there are big attractions for struggling eurozone econo-
mies to return to growth via a strategy of devaluation and 
default, and to exit from the currency union. The advan-
tages would potentially include improved competitiveness 
and circumventing downward nominal wage rigidity, less 
need to run primary budget surpluses in pursuit of fiscal 
sustainability, and the opportunity to implement a new 
monetary policy framework. However, whether an exit 
can be achieved without triggering a massive financial 
crisis is doubtful, and probably enough has been done to 
persuade those thinking of leaving the eurozone not to 
take the gamble.
The ECB was designed for a normal economy to 
promote benign macroeconomic outcomes through a 
form of inflation targeting. Its independence is prized 
not least by Germans who formerly put their faith in the 
Bundesbank. In present circumstances, however, a ‘subser-
vient’ 1950s-style central bank might actually be more 
conducive to economic recovery.
Conventional wisdom is still that medium-term 
growth prospects are unaffected by the eurozone crisis. 
Considering both the direct effects and the pressures to 
change policies in directions that will undermine rather 
than stimulate growth, this seems too optimistic. A major 
implication of the crisis is a long period of very high public 
debt-to-GDP ratios in eurozone economies. Past experi-
ence says that this could reduce growth performance by 
0.75 percentage points per year. Attempts to address this 
issue through fiscal consolidation, which may last for 
many years, will further depress growth and it seems likely 
there will be some retreat from economic integration in 
both trade and capital markets, while market-friendly 
reforms that could improve growth performance are now 
far less likely.
‘
Overall, it seems clear that, 
while the euro may have been 
saved, medium-term growth 
prospects have been  
jeopardized ’www.chathamhouse.org   www.warwick.ac.uk/go/cage
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